In addition, the hearsay rule theory states that if a human statement is presented as evidence of the truth of the alleged fact, the applicant`s credit becomes the basis for the conclusion and, therefore, the assertion can only be admitted into evidence if it is made on the witness stand, subject to the cross-examination test. However, if an extrajudicial statement is made, not as an allegation to prove the alleged thing, but without reference to the veracity of the alleged case, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a defamation case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the defendant say that the plaintiff was a thief, that testimony is not admissible to prove that the plaintiff was really a thief, but only to show that the defendant uttered those words. This type of statement is hearsay, but not legal hearsay. A distinction is thus made between: (a) the fact that the statement was made to which the hearsay rule does not apply and (b) the veracity of the facts alleged in the statement to which the hearsay rule applies. Rule 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Procedure is, of course, not the only rule explaining why hearsay testimony should be excluded from the examination. The hearsay exclusion is also intended to preserve the opposing party`s right to cross-examine the original claimant who claims to have direct knowledge of the transaction or event. If hearsay is allowed, the right may be denied because the declarant is not in court. Secondly, it should be emphasized that the right to cross-examine the opposing party`s witness is the only means of verifying the credibility of witnesses and their statements, for which the administration of justice is essential. This rule does not govern the situation of a witness who testifies by hearsay as such if he has personal knowledge of the testimony given. Sections 801 and 805 would apply.

However, this rule would prevent him from testifying about hearsay, since he has no personal knowledge of it. Finally, Rule 602 states that the requirement of personal knowledge for witness testimony “shall be subject to the provisions of Rule 703.” The latter rule allows an expert witness to testify in the form of an expert opinion based on personal knowledge and other facts or data “brought to his attention”, provided that the essential requirements of the report are met. G.S. 8C-602. In other words, the witness must have personally seen, heard or experienced or personally experienced the case about which he or she is now testifying. See, for example, State v. Riddick, 315 N.C. 749 (1986) (the witness` testimony about what she heard from the respondent was based on personal knowledge); State v. Redd, 144 N.C. App. 248 (2001) (“As an eyewitness to undercover purchases, Dixon had personal acquaintances. He was therefore competent to testify as a lay witness about secret purchases”); see also State v.

Watson, 179 N.C. App. 228 (2006) (The trial court did not err in allowing detective`s testimony to conclude that defendant “had no living brothers” based on the detective`s personal knowledge acquired through the research and investigation). The term used in the law of evidence refers to any evidence that is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it was taken and that, therefore, does not depend entirely on his credibility and weight on the confidence that the court may have in him. Its value, if any, is measured by the recognition to be given to certain third parties who are not sworn witnesses to this fact and are therefore not subject to cross-examination. [3] In short, it is “proof not of what the witness himself knows, but of what he has heard from others.” [4] In one case, for example, we found that “their testimony is based on what the witness would have been told, nor is it without obvious hearsay probative value.” [5] (Citations withheld; A witness may testify on a case only if sufficient evidence is presented to support the conclusion that he or she has personal knowledge of the case. The evidence proving personal knowledge may, but is not required, consist of the testimony of the witness himself. This rule is subject to the provisions of Article 703 on the deposition of experts. Personal knowledge of a matter also includes the feelings, reactions, conclusions or conclusions of the witness about what he observed, provided that these thoughts are rationally based on the personal perception of the witness. See G.S. 8C-602, Official Commentary (“Personal knowledge is not absolute, but may consist of what the witness thinks he knows about his personal perception”). See, for example, State v.

Sharpless, 221 N.C. App. 132 (2012) (“Dowd simply gave his understanding and interpretation of what was happening at the door, based on the fact that he was sitting in the next room and hearing the whole situation”); State v. Elkins, 210 N.C. App. 110 (2011) (“A witness testifies to his personal knowledge when describing his own state of mind and explaining the thoughts that motivate his own behavior”), cites State v. Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382 (2009) (The witness`s finding that a sale of weapons had taken place although she had not witnessed it directly was a profane opinion admissible under rule 701, based on her remarks that “her husband obtained firearms after speaking to the respondent; When the accused and Malanowski arrived, Mr.

Davis showed the weapons to the defendant; that she had heard the defendant explain his need for a firearm; that she had noticed that weapons had disappeared from the house after the accused had left; and that she later saw that her husband had a considerable amount of money”); State v. Walston, 193 N.C. App. 134 (2008) (officer spoke with personal knowledge when describing how the chase was conducted by a dog and what resulted); State v. Wright, 151 N.C. App. 493 (2002) (“At the time of the shooting, Wright was able to hear the circumstances of the shooting and observe the events immediately afterwards. Accordingly, his personal knowledge was such that he could reasonably conclude that the accused had shot the victim”); Staat v. Lloyd, 354 N.C.

76 (2001) (“The instantaneous conclusions of the mind about the appearance, state or mental or physical state of persons, animals and things, which result from the observation of a multitude of facts presented simultaneously to the senses, are legally facts and admissible as evidence.”); State v. Jones, 98 N.C. App. 342 (1990) (no error in officer`s admission to testify that informant knew where the respondent lived: “Sergeant Bell and other local agents coordinated this covert operation, including the deployment of this informant. It can therefore be concluded that Sergeant Bell personally knew that the informant knew where the respondent lived. With this separate opinion, I would simply like to refer to the previous passage, so as not to be wrongly perceived as a derogation from the rule relating to the admission and use of out-of-court statements as evidence, the accuracy and accuracy of which do not lie in the personal knowledge of the declarant. I recall clearly that in my concurring and dissenting opinion in Re: Allegations under oath made at the hearing of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013, against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan,1 I spoke forcefully about the standard: To be clear, personal knowledge is a material requirement to accept testimony, establish the veracity of a disputed fact. The Court clarified this in Patula v.

People: Evidence of the witness` personal knowledge in the case may come from other evidence in the case or from the testimony itself. See G.S. 8C-602, Official Commentary (“The preliminary statement of personal knowledge need not be explicit, but may be implied from the witness` testimony”). In addition to events or events directly observed or experienced by the witness, “personal knowledge” includes several other important types of information. Records indicate that no one witnessed the incident. In fact, apart from the testimony of police investigator Pat. Nestor Napao-it, none of the other three prosecution witnesses, namely: (1) Angelo Tongko – an employee of Dunkin` donut who testified that he found Aurelio Coya`s body in the facility supervisor`s room in the early morning of August 9, 1991, (2) Dr. Marcial Cenido – the doctor who performed an autopsy on Aurelio Cuya`s body and testified about the cause of his death; and 3) Teresita Cuya – the wife of Aurelio Cuya, who testified on the civil aspect of the case, which directly or indirectly attributed the commission of the crime to the complainant. With regard to the testimony of Pat.

Nestor Napao-it, it is not disputed that his testimony on the conduct of the investigation is admissible as evidence because he has personal knowledge of it. However, his testimony about the complainant`s alleged separate confessions to Hilda Dolera and Maribel Diong, which the trial court has always considered in its decision as evidence of the truth of the facts alleged therein, is hearsay. In Woodroffes` terse language, this statement is “proof not of what the witness himself knows, but of what he has heard from others.” And whether it is disputed or not, as in this case, this statement has no probative value.