I have decided, in accordance with the authority conferred upon me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, that the United States will comply with its international obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Avena case. by the State courts enforcing the decision in accordance with the general principles of comity in the cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals referred to in this decision.200 If the same type of unilateral withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the ICJ (assuming its legality) will occur when other States find themselves in similar situations, is an open question, as many multilateral treaties (as opposed to the optional clause) deal with very narrow issues and States parties may be less concerned. on compulsory competence in these areas. However, it is quite possible that new restrictions on the ICJ`s mandatory jurisdiction will continue. Many states will not be satisfied until their agreements reflect cooperation with the ICJ only in cases where the worst possible adverse judgments against them have already been anticipated and discarded. In this sense, future ICJ jurisprudence may not be different from public international arbitration. Avena stands out among recent cases as a predictor of what states` attitudes towards the ICJ might look like in the future. As mentioned earlier, Avena was the third in a series of cases under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in which the ICJ called on the United States, in an increasingly restrictive tone, to review the convictions of foreign death row inmates whose consular communication rights had been violated. Commentators had good reason to doubt that the ICJ`s decisions would lead to U.S. compliance, and were surprised when the President of the United States was “determined to […] that the United States will comply with its international obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Avena case.” However, this is a Pyrrhic victory for those who hoped for a change in the United States` attitude towards international jurisprudence, as it then immediately withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the Convention, thus depriving the Court of jurisdiction for similar disputes in the future. A number of subtle points emerge from the text: first, only ICJ “judgments” are subject to the execution of Article 94. Secondly, only the creditor State has the right to refer the matter to the Security Council; this was not the case with the League of Nations and the Permanent Court38 Thirdly, the Security Council seems to remain at its discretion as to whether it should act and, if so, what concrete measures it decides to take. It is therefore clear that the execution of ICJ judgments essentially involves political acts of both parties and of the Security Council in which the Court itself has little involvement and over which it has no power.

It is therefore at least partially inappropriate to blame the ICJ (as some commentators sometimes do) when States fail to comply with its decisions, as the Charter entrusts the Security Council with responsibility for enforcement.39 Each member of the Tribunal solemnly declares in open session before taking office that he or she will exercise his or her powers impartially and conscientiously. Finally, the Court of Justice is not a supreme court to which national courts can turn; It does not act as a court of last resort for individuals. Nor is it a court of appeal for an international tribunal. However, it may decide on the validity of arbitral awards. The International Court of Justice does not have the power to bring to justice those accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity. Since it is not a criminal court, it does not have a prosecutor who can prosecute. International institutions are plagued by too many expectations and too little power. A striking example is the International Court of Justice. His dissatisfied critics criticize the Court as an ineffective actor in achieving peace and security in the world, largely because of its perceived inability to control state behavior.

Scientists have long attributed this to the ICJ`s “imperfect” jurisdictional architecture, which relies entirely on consent. It is believed that anything that is not a clear consent of the respondent State in a particular case carries serious risks of non-compliance. This article disputes that assessment. By analyzing the final decisions of the ICJ since the landmark nicaragua v. In the United States, it can be seen that the manner in which the ICJ has been deprived of jurisdiction is in fact a poor predictor of subsequent compliance. On the contrary, almost all of the Court`s decisions have achieved substantial, if imperfect, compliance through complex mechanisms of the signal of authority and the political inertia generated by those decisions. Despite the likelihood that States will continue to limit the scope of the ICJ`s compulsory jurisdiction, the World Court will remain an important, albeit limited, instrument for resolving intergovernmental disputes and a force for global public order. This task is entrusted to national courts, ad hoc criminal tribunals established by the United Nations (such as the International Residual Mechanism of Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), which are responsible for carrying out the residual functions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)) or in cooperation with it (such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Court for Lebanon), reserved. and the International Criminal Court, established under the Rome Statute.

In the midst of an increase in conflicting scientific evidence on the ICJ`s institutional problems, the decline of mandatory jurisdiction, the strength or weakness of its compliance record, and its future place in the settlement of international disputes, this article sought to examine the issue from a more factual and non-doctrinal perspective. Echoing five recent cases of alleged non-compliance with Nicaragua, she argued that the Post-Nicaraguan Court as a whole has in fact seen better implementation of its final decisions (although it has sometimes taken years to achieve substantial compliance), regardless of how jurisdiction was acquired. The manner in which its jurisdiction was referred to the ICJ therefore appears to be a rather poor predictor of subsequent compliance. Part 4 addressed some of the implications of these findings, including the somewhat ironic, but not entirely surprising, phenomenon of increased record registration and compliance, but decreased compliance with mandatory jurisdiction. However, it is rare for the ICJ to allow international organizations other than the one requesting the opinion to participate in advisory procedures. The only international non-governmental organizations ever authorized by the ICJ to provide information ultimately did not do so (international status of South West Africa). The Court rejected all such requests from private parties. 2. The Registrar shall also inform, by means of a special and direct communication, of any State entitled to appear before the Court of Justice or of an international organisation which, in the opinion of the Court or, failing that, of the President, agrees to provide information on the matter which the Court is prepared to receive; to make written statements within a time limit to be determined by the President or to hear oral statements on the matter at a public meeting to be held for that purpose.

In the search for less destructive ways of resolving conflicts between States, one of the most durable and idealistic solutions advocated was to expand the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ” or “the Court”). Since its foundation at the beginning of the 20th century. Under the auspices of the ICJ, international lawyers viewed judicial settlement as a fundamental means of settling international disputes and perhaps as one of the most powerful mechanisms for the effective application of international law, reflecting the role of national courts within the State. Judge Hersh Lauterpacht was of the view that “the principal objective of the International Court of Justice […] lies in its function as an instrument for the establishment of peace, insofar as this objective can be achieved by law1 and “[t]he very existence of the Court, in particular in connection with the essential degree of mandatory jurisdiction already conferred on it, tends to be an important factor in respect for the rule of law”.2 If the ICJ has not been able to: the Court of Justice shall exercise its functions as a plenary session, but may also, at the request of the parties, set up ad hoc chambers for the examination of certain cases.